Bitcoins/Litecoins/Virtual Currencies

Arden

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Yep, market definitely seems to be anticipating passage.

My sources are telling me that the White House has agreed on an "ethics package" which was the thing that was holding things up. I think that's boosting the sentiment. There's a big but there- some of the holdouts that were demanding the ethics package are saying "yeah the White House has agreed to something but we haven't seen it and we are very skeptical."

I took a small position in a coin I've been eyeing for quite some time and I'm glad I did because it's already up double digits percentage-wise.

Either clarity fails to pass and it drops and I buy more or clarity passes and it pumps and I wish I bought more 😔
 

Arden

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Well, something just happened to turn the prediction markets negative. Not clear what. Someone got insider info.
 

Kithani

Vyemm Raider
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Yep, market definitely seems to be anticipating passage.

My sources are telling me that the White House has agreed on an "ethics package" which was the thing that was holding things up. I think that's boosting the sentiment. There's a big but there- some of the holdouts that were demanding the ethics package are saying "yeah the White House has agreed to something but we haven't seen it and we are very skeptical."

I took a small position in a coin I've been eyeing for quite some time and I'm glad I did because it's already up double digits percentage-wise.

Either clarity fails to pass and it drops and I buy more or clarity passes and it pumps and I wish I bought more 😔
wtf are you “sources”?
 

Furry

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wtf are you “sources”?
Dancing GIF
 
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Haus

I am Big Balls!
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Well, something just happened to turn the prediction markets negative. Not clear what. Someone got insider info.
Apparently, it seems the "Ethics provisions" assign the DoJ as the enforcement/prosecution power and the democrats wanted that pushed down to the state AGs. At least that's the best reason I've read so far today.
 

Arden

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wtf are you “sources”?

I guess "sources" oversells it a little lol. My sources are just reporters I follow that specifically cover this stuff.

Fwiw it's super hard to get full/accurate/fast info on crypto-related things because:

1. It's still very much a tertiary concern for trad fin reporters.
2. Most of the people who DO follow crypto closely are trying to sell something, so you can't really trust it.

I have managed to find a couple really good/fast/reliable reporters, though- and that's what I mean by my "sources"
 
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Arden

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Kinda funny. All signs I'm seeing point to a 90% chance Clarity dies, yet crypto is pumping.
 
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Flobee

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Serious Cold Card vulnerability around its private key generation. If you're using a CC of any sort and you let it generate your entropy you need to move your funds immediately. If you used a passphrase or dice entropy you're safer, but should still move. Bugs like this for hardware wallets are super rare and this one is particularly bad. ~600 BTC confirmed stolen. Vulnerability was found and exploited via AI and luckily the one that exploited it wasn't very sophisticated (or didn't act like it), it could have been significantly worse.

Coinkite advisory:


Greater detail on vulnerability:

I've recommended ColdCard here so if you picked one up I hope you're not affected. In the future I'll be a lot more careful about generating entropy and if I'm honest giving suggestions.

EDIT: To be clear because I suspect there will be stories tomorrow "Bitcoin Hacked!" this was an issue with the entropy generation on a single manufacturers hardware wallet firmware and has nothing to do with Bitcoin itself. That being said it was on a highly trusted signing device and its nasty, looking like 1000+ BTC potentially stolen so far.
 
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Flobee

Ahn'Qiraj Raider
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Serious Cold Card vulnerability around its private key generation. If you're using a CC of any sort and you let it generate your entropy you need to move your funds immediately. If you used a passphrase or dice entropy you're safer, but should still move. Bugs like this for hardware wallets are super rare and this one is particularly bad. ~600 BTC confirmed stolen. Vulnerability was found and exploited via AI and luckily the one that exploited it wasn't very sophisticated (or didn't act like it), it could have been significantly worse.

Coinkite advisory:


Greater detail on vulnerability:

I've recommended ColdCard here so if you picked one up I hope you're not affected. In the future I'll be a lot more careful about generating entropy and if I'm honest giving suggestions.

EDIT: To be clear because I suspect there will be stories tomorrow "Bitcoin Hacked!" this was an issue with the entropy generation on a single manufacturers hardware wallet firmware and has nothing to do with Bitcoin itself. That being said it was on a highly trusted signing device and its nasty, looking like 1000+ BTC potentially stolen so far.
 

Flobee

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1367 final count (unless ppl haven't updated yet)


Yea this is an ongoing thing. They'll get drained until none are left. It's all Coldcards that used the default entropy and didn't roll their own at this point, more advanced models just take more compute to break, so takes longer. I expect the number to keep climbing for quite a while. A lot of normal folks gunna think they've got a safe stack and it's all gone. Really sad.

The details of the problem is really sad. Simply put they had a function to generate the RNG and it shared the name with a default python library function for RNG that is not nearly robust enough for this use case. The code was architected in such a way that when the call to their proprietary RNG function (which is good) failed it just called the default one. Stupid mistake if your writing normal code, gross negligence in the circumstance of generating private key entropy
 
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Flobee

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Jesus Christ the jargon usage makes it impossible for a normal person to follow any of this stuff lol.
They had a faulty number maker. The good number maker that they thought they were using wasn't actually getting used. Big computer number guessers guessing the right number to steal people's money.

Hope that helps
 
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Seananigans

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They had a faulty number maker. The good number maker that they thought they were using wasn't actually getting used. Big computer number guessers guessing the right number to steal people's money.

Hope that helps

I mean somewhere between retard and insider jargon would be ideal, but yeah, that’s at least a little more clear!
 

Flobee

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I mean somewhere between retard and insider jargon would be ideal, but yeah, that’s at least a little more clear!
Probably need someone smarter than me to explain the relationship between entropy, random number generation, and a hardware wallet seed phrase in an easy to understand way haha. Cryptography is complicated.

I've enlisted the assistance of big number guesser himself though and he did a pretty good job

To explain how a seed phrase gets compromised in a situation like the one described, it helps to understand how **entropy**, **randomness**, and **seed generation** form the foundation of crypto security—and what happens when one link in that chain breaks.

---

## 1. Entropy: The Pool of Possibilities

**Entropy** is a measure of unpredictability or "true randomness." In cryptography, high entropy means there are so many possible outcomes that it is mathematically impossible for anyone—or any supercomputer—to guess your secret.

* **High Entropy:** Imagine choosing a specific grain of sand from every beach on Earth. It is impossible for someone to guess which grain you picked because the pool of possibilities is staggering ($2^{256}$ potential seed combinations).
* **Low Entropy:** Imagine picking a number between 1 and 100. A computer can guess that in milliseconds because the pool of possibilities is tiny.

---

## 2. Randomness (RNG): The Machine Drawing the Number

**Randomness** is the process used to pick a secret from that pool. To get high entropy, you need a **Cryptographically Secure Random Number Generator (CSPRNG)**. Hardware wallets usually use dedicated hardware chips (like thermal noise or radio noise sensors) to capture true physical chaos.

* **Cryptographic RNG:** Draws numbers in a way that is completely unpredictable, non-repeating, and impossible to reconstruct.
* **Standard/Default RNG (e.g., Python's standard `random` library):** Designed for things like video games, statistical simulations, or shuffling a digital deck of cards. It is a "pseudo-random" number generator. While it *looks* random to a human, it follows predictable mathematical algorithms. If an attacker knows the algorithm and a few clues, they can predict every number it will ever output.

---

## 3. Seed Generation: Baking the Entropy into 12 or 24 Words

When you set up a hardware wallet, it goes through a specific sequence:

1. **Collects Entropy:** The wallet gathers raw bits of entropy (unpredictable 0s and 1s) using its hardware RNG.
2. **Generates a Seed:** It converts those random bits into a master private key.
3. **Translates to Words:** That long mathematical key is converted into your human-readable 12- or 24-word recovery phrase.

If the raw entropy collected in step 1 is truly random, your seed phrase is locked behind a door that no computer in the universe can break open.

---

## 4. Bringing It All Together: What Happened in the Context

The scenario described highlights a critical point where this pipeline broke down:

```
[Hardware RNG Fails] ──> [Silent Fallback] ──> [Standard Python RNG Used] ──> [Low Entropy Seed Created]

```

1. **The Intended Design:** The wallet was supposed to use a custom, high-entropy random number function.
2. **The Software Glitch:** A naming conflict caused the code to silently fall back to Python’s default `random` module when the primary RNG failed.
3. **The Loss of Entropy:** Instead of drawing your seed from a pool of endless possibilities, the hardware wallet generated seeds from a small, mathematically predictable list produced by Python's standard RNG.
4. **The "Big Computer Guessers":** Because Python's default RNG isn't cryptographically secure, attackers running brute-force scripts don't have to search $2^{256}$ combinations. They only have to cycle through the predictable outputs of the weak algorithm to recreate the exact seed phrases generated by those affected wallets and drain the funds.

> **Key Takeaway:** Hardware wallet security relies entirely on high entropy. If the process for picking numbers drops from true cryptographic randomness to a simple software algorithm, even a 24-word seed phrase becomes easy for an attacker's automated script to guess.
 
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Seananigans

Honorary Shit-PhD
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Probably need someone smarter than me to explain the relationship between entropy, random number generation, and a hardware wallet seed phrase in an easy to understand way haha. Cryptography is complicated.

I've enlisted the assistance of big number guesser himself though and he did a pretty good job

To explain how a seed phrase gets compromised in a situation like the one described, it helps to understand how **entropy**, **randomness**, and **seed generation** form the foundation of crypto security—and what happens when one link in that chain breaks.

---

## 1. Entropy: The Pool of Possibilities

**Entropy** is a measure of unpredictability or "true randomness." In cryptography, high entropy means there are so many possible outcomes that it is mathematically impossible for anyone—or any supercomputer—to guess your secret.

* **High Entropy:** Imagine choosing a specific grain of sand from every beach on Earth. It is impossible for someone to guess which grain you picked because the pool of possibilities is staggering ($2^{256}$ potential seed combinations).
* **Low Entropy:** Imagine picking a number between 1 and 100. A computer can guess that in milliseconds because the pool of possibilities is tiny.

---

## 2. Randomness (RNG): The Machine Drawing the Number

**Randomness** is the process used to pick a secret from that pool. To get high entropy, you need a **Cryptographically Secure Random Number Generator (CSPRNG)**. Hardware wallets usually use dedicated hardware chips (like thermal noise or radio noise sensors) to capture true physical chaos.

* **Cryptographic RNG:** Draws numbers in a way that is completely unpredictable, non-repeating, and impossible to reconstruct.
* **Standard/Default RNG (e.g., Python's standard `random` library):** Designed for things like video games, statistical simulations, or shuffling a digital deck of cards. It is a "pseudo-random" number generator. While it *looks* random to a human, it follows predictable mathematical algorithms. If an attacker knows the algorithm and a few clues, they can predict every number it will ever output.

---

## 3. Seed Generation: Baking the Entropy into 12 or 24 Words

When you set up a hardware wallet, it goes through a specific sequence:

1. **Collects Entropy:** The wallet gathers raw bits of entropy (unpredictable 0s and 1s) using its hardware RNG.
2. **Generates a Seed:** It converts those random bits into a master private key.
3. **Translates to Words:** That long mathematical key is converted into your human-readable 12- or 24-word recovery phrase.

If the raw entropy collected in step 1 is truly random, your seed phrase is locked behind a door that no computer in the universe can break open.

---

## 4. Bringing It All Together: What Happened in the Context

The scenario described highlights a critical point where this pipeline broke down:

```
[Hardware RNG Fails] ──> [Silent Fallback] ──> [Standard Python RNG Used] ──> [Low Entropy Seed Created]

```

1. **The Intended Design:** The wallet was supposed to use a custom, high-entropy random number function.
2. **The Software Glitch:** A naming conflict caused the code to silently fall back to Python’s default `random` module when the primary RNG failed.
3. **The Loss of Entropy:** Instead of drawing your seed from a pool of endless possibilities, the hardware wallet generated seeds from a small, mathematically predictable list produced by Python's standard RNG.
4. **The "Big Computer Guessers":** Because Python's default RNG isn't cryptographically secure, attackers running brute-force scripts don't have to search $2^{256}$ combinations. They only have to cycle through the predictable outputs of the weak algorithm to recreate the exact seed phrases generated by those affected wallets and drain the funds.

> **Key Takeaway:** Hardware wallet security relies entirely on high entropy. If the process for picking numbers drops from true cryptographic randomness to a simple software algorithm, even a 24-word seed phrase becomes easy for an attacker's automated script to guess.

Yeah I think what was throwing me was the usage of entropy. I may be too stupid to understand why it was chosen, but I feel like the people who first set up this terminology chose poorly when they chose “entropy” as the word to describe what they’re describing with it.
 

sliverstorm

Blackwing Lair Raider
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Been reading about this the past few days.

Like Flobee Flobee said, Entropy in this context = size of the search space. Rolling a 6-sided die is technically "random" but low entropy because there are only 6 possibilities. if someone told you they set their password by rolling one die, you could guess it by brute force in about two seconds.

For Coldcard, the software was supposed to use an algorithm with 2^256 possibilities. To put that in perspective, an extremely generous estimate of all binary computational power exerted since computers have existed would be 2^120. If we pretended we could somehow duplicate that output EVERY SECOND, it would take 10^71 years to complete a brute force search of that space (for even more perspective, time since big bang = 10^10).

Due to a bug, Coldcard reverted to using a default python library with 2^32 possibilities, or just under 4.3 billion. Estimate for my gaming computer to run/test that space using the initial attacker's process end-to-end is well under an hour.

What actually happened:
  1. A user's Coldcard would output the normal 24 word seed phrase representing their 256-bit seed. What the user did not know was that due to the bug, the 256-bit seed was generated using ~8 linked calls of the same 32-bit RNG algorithm (linked meaning all 8 ultimately relied on the same input, so the total possibility space, or entropy, was still only 2^32).
  2. After identifying this vulnerability in Coldcard's code, the attacker used the code to generate the 4.3 billion possible output seed numbers/phrases, used those seed numbers to generate the 4.3 billion implied public bitcoin addresses, and then compared those to a copy of the public bitcoin ledger to find the addresses that both actually existed and had BTC in them.
  3. For each identified address, using the same seed number/phase, the attacker then generated the private key to request the transaction moving all that address's BTC to their own address.
So everyone who didn't set any passphrase outside of the 24 words generated from the 256-bit key that only actually had 32-bit entropy got torched.

Now, other attacks are combining the above search space with traditional dictionary attacks to steal from people who did set a "25th word" passphrase but chose weak/common passwords.